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S p e c i a l  f e a t u r e
It is more than ten years now since Lester Brownlaunched his well known wake-up call of “Who will feedChina?”((2) Apart from soybeans, the massive imports of
grain((3) Brown predicted have yet to appear (it is true that
Brown’s projections were made for the year 2030, so there’s
still time to wait for the worst); on the contrary, in the last
12 years China witnessed only three years of grain trade
deficits: 1995, 1996, and 2004 (with deficits of 20, 10, and
5 million tonnes respectively), and China has actually been
a net exporter since 2005. Although this situation may
change, major grain exporting countries continue to await
their long-anticipated grain orders from China. Where is the
grain? This is a question puzzling most foreign observers of
China.
Our opinion is that past projections of China’s future grain
needs were based on data of uneven quality from China’s
National Bureau of Statistics (NBSC). Food consumption
patterns therefore remain a matter of debate in China, and
different assumptions lead to very different scenarios as far
as food security is concerned. In this paper we will try to
clarify these patterns, mainly for grain and meat, in hopes of
achieving a better understanding of the significance of “food
security” in China.The  “meat  miracl e”
The term “miracle” has often been employed in describing the
overall performances of the Chinese economy.((4) But another
miracle, if indeed proved, would be of great significance in
assessing food consumption patterns in China. This is what we
call the “meat miracle.” Deng Fujiang, deputy director of the
China Meat Association, stated per capita consumption of
pork to be 39.6 kg for 2006,((5) a figure corresponding to data
published by the NBSC for 2006, which show an output of
51.972 million tonnes for 1,314 million persons.((6)
In our opinion, this figure is simply false. To take one exam-
ple, the pork supply per capita in Taiwan was 39.4 kg in
2005; can we believe it was almost exactly the same on the
mainland?((7) Even allowing for Taiwan’s greater availability
of poultry meat (32 kg against 12 kg on the mainland), it
seems doubtful that China, with a rural population of 737
million (56 percent of the total population) known for its low
meat consumption, could rival the advanced country of
Taiwan in this respect.
Not only would the official meat output figure (81 million
tonnes, out of which 52 million tonnes is pork) translate into
an incredibly high per capita availability for China’s level of
economic development and urbanisation, but it would be a
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3. In Chinese terms, “grain” (liangshi) includes cereals (with paddy in place of rice),
tubers (at one fifth of their gross weight) and pulses (mainly soybean).
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5. China Daily, 17 September 2007.
6. NBSC, China Statistical Yearbook 2007, Beijing, China Statistics Press, 2007, pp. 105, 485.
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Food consumption patterns remain a matter of debate in China, and different assumptions lead to very different
scenarios as far as food security is concerned. In this paper we will try to clarify these patterns, mainly for grain and
meat, with a view to achieving a better understanding of the significance of “food security” in China.
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miraculous achievement based on the feed resources avail-
able in China.
Many researchers have shied away from making this calculation
(meat v. feed grain) under the pretext that the great diversity in
animal husbandry methods, particularly at the small farms level,
subverts accurate calculation of grain/meat transformation
ratios. The fact is, however, that yearly surveys have been car-
ried out at the farm level to determine the costs and benefits of
all main agricultural products. In regards to animal husbandry,
detailed technical and economic data have been reported, such
as the feed grain (or the fine grain, including soybean cakes and
milling sub-products) used for each category of animals (pigs,
poultry, etc.) and of farms (small peasant farms, middle or large
sizes breeding units, etc.). These data correspond well with the
average figures that we have collected in our own field surveys.
Using the ratios presented in the last available survey,((8) we
can evaluate the resources required for animal products using
mainly fine grain for feed (which excludes beef and mutton
from the calculation, as well as grain used for aquaculture,
where data is lacking). The data presented here are drawn
from the relevant yearbooks for 2005 (see Table 1).
According to this calculation, about 290 million tonnes of feed
grain, soybean cakes, and milling sub-products would have
been needed to achieve the claimed amount of meat and ani-
mal products. The problem now is to compare this figure with
the grain available for feed after deducting other uses. 
Estimates  of  grain use ,  2005
Fortunately, the Grain Administration recently published
balance sheets for grain usage.((9) The presentation of the
data varied somewhat in the years 2004 and 2005, but we
have been able to reconstruct the distribution of each grain
use, with crushed soybean counted as feed, and milling sub-
products as percentages of food rice and wheat((10) (see
Table 2).
According to these official data, the available feed grain
(soybean included) totalled 158 million tonnes (155 million
tonnes for 2004 in the China Grain Development Report
2005),((11) to which we add 43 million tonnes of milling sub-
products. If these calculations are correct, only about 200
million tonnes of fine grain would have been available in
2005 against the total of 290 million tonnes required.
These calculations and results are not new. At a conference
in London in January 1998, we made similar calculations for
the year 1996, showing a gap of 45-75 million tonnes of
grain.((12) A few months later, after the first results of the
Agricultural Census for 1996 were published, the official
figure for meat production was reduced by 22 percent to 46
million tonnes (out of which 32 million tonnes was pork).
Output figures for previous years were simply dropped from
the subsequent Yearbooks. The same exercise for 2001
showed a deficit of 43 million tonnes.((13)
If a third of the feed needed is lacking, does that mean the
actual meat output (particularly pork) is more than 30 per-
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8. Price Department, National Development and Reform Commission, Quanguo nongchan-
bin chengben shouyi ziliao huibian (Compendium of Materials on Costs and Benefits of
Agricultural Products of the Whole Country), Beijing, China Statistics Press, 2006.
9. China Grain R &T Center, 2006 Zhongguo liangshi fazhan baogao (China Grain
Development Report 2006), Beijing, Economic Management Press, p. 106.
10. Interestingly enough, a paper by Luo Liangguo, Li Ninghui, and Yang Jiancang (“Basic
judgment on grain production and consumption in China,” in Nongye jingji wenti (Issues
in Agricultural Economy), February 2005, pp. 49-52), referred to hereafter as “Luo
2005,” presents detailed data on grain usage for the years 1999 to 2003. Total usage is
compared with outputs, with separate data for rice, wheat, corn, and soybean. Then dif-
ferent uses (for the total amount of grain, not the separate components) are presented
for the same years, differentiating seeds, losses, rural and urban food, and industrial
uses. The source quoted for the tables is “China’s Rural Statistical Yearbook,” (NBSC,
Zhongguo nongcun tongji nianjian, 1999-2003), but we have verified that this yearbook
did not present the corresponding data. We therefore assume that the authors actually
referred to unpublished data from the Grain Bureau (before they were subsequently
published in the Grain Development Report).
For the year 2003, the total uses of all grains were 270 million tonnes for food, 138 mil-
lion tonnes for feed, and 45 million tonnes for industrial uses. These figures are consis-
tent with those in the Report for 2005 as deduced in Table 2.
11. Op. cit. p. 100.
12. Claude Aubert, “Food Consumption and Food Production in China, statistical uncertain-
ties, educated guesses, and reasoned optimism,” in Robert Ash (ed.), China’s Integration
in Asia, Richmond, Curzon, 2002, pp. 99-134.
13. Claude Aubert, “Consommations alimentaires : l’inconnue chinoise,” in Déméter 2005,
Economie et stratégies agricoles, Paris, Club Déméter, September 2004, pp. 19-41.
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cent lower than the official figure? For pork alone, the
resulting supply figure of 28 kg per capita would be more in
line with the structure of population and present state of
development of the economy.
As feed grain is usually calculated as the remainder of grain
available after deducting all other uses, it would be interest-
ing to verify the plausibility of the figure of 155-157 million
tonnes given in the Grain Bureau Report. For this purpose,
7N o  2 0 0 8 / 2
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S p e c i a l  f e a t u r e
we propose to begin by calculating grain food consumption for
the year 2005 (see Table 3). The details of the food ration
for the rural population are available in the China Yearbook
of Rural Household Survey,((14) with figures for cereals
expressed in un-milled terms (paddy, wheat). Those of the
urban population are to be found in the China Urban Life
and Price Yearbook((15) and are expressed in terms of amounts
milled for cereals (rice, flour), and more generally concern
only the quantities purchased. In order to take out-of-door con-
sumption into account, the reported rations have been multi-
plied by a coefficient of 1.25 (urban net rectified figure). The
ratio of milled rice to paddy is estimated at 0.65, and that for
flour/wheat at 0.8 in order to convert the net (milled) figures
of the urban rations to their gross equivalents.
Our total food grain estimate, 246 million tonnes, is lower
than that of the Grain Bureau Report (261 million tonnes).
The difference probably stems from the Bureau calculation
using the “countryside population” reported in the
“Agriculture” Chapter of the China Statistical Yearbook
(949 million persons)((16) instead of the rural population as
defined in the “Population Chapter” (745 million per-
sons).((17) If the calculations in Table 3 are based on gross
food grain rations distributed on the basis of 949 million
“rural” inhabitants and 359 “urban” inhabitants, the result is
total food consumption of 256 million tonnes, a figure close
to the bureau’s 263 million tonnes.((18)
8 N o  2 0 0 8 / 2
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14. National Bureau of Statistics of China, Zhongguo nongcun zhuhu diaocha nianjian 2006
(China Yearbook of Rural Household Survey 2006), Beijing, China Statistics Press, 2006.
15. National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2006 Zhongguo chengshi (zhen) shenghuo yu
jiage nianjian (China Urban Life and Price Yearbook 2006), Beijing, China Statistics
Press. For the previous years the survey was published under the name of Zhongguo
jiage ji chengzhen jumin jiating shouzhi diaocha tongji nianjian (China Statistical
Yearbook of Prices and Survey of Incomes and Expenses of Urban Households).
16. China Statistical Yearbook 2006, p. 463.
17. Ibid. p. 99.
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If feed and industrial uses of grain from the Grain Bureau
Report seem reliable enough, the residual “other” category
deduced from this report is too vague to be accurately inter-
preted. We have therefore drawn our own balance sheet of
grain uses for the year 2005, to be compared with that pre-
sented in Table 2 (see Table 4). 
In this table, seeds usage has been deduced from the yearly
report of Agricultural Costs and Benefits, and losses calcu-
lated at an average of 6 percent of total output. The food
uses are those estimated in Table 3, and most of the figures
for feed and industrial uses are derived from the Grain
Bureau Report. The total feed has been adjusted to corre-
spond to the needs that we will present later in this paper,
following new estimates of meat outputs. This allowed us to
calculate the changes in stock for feed from the residual fig-
ures produced after deducting food and industrial uses.
These changes in the stock seem to confirm the plausibility
of our usage figures. In particular, wheat supply was already
in surplus in 2005, and market prices began to drop at the
end of the year. The trend was reversed in 2006 through
massive procurements by the State at floor-level prices,
which resulted in an artificial scarcity at the end of 2006 and
inflation of flour prices. Since then, the harvest continued to
increase in 2006 (104 million tonnes) but the prices have
still been pushed up by international wheat deficits. As for
corn, a deficit seems to have already appeared in 2005,
fuelled by increased use in the production of bio-ethanol.
Since then, prices have shot up in China as well as in the
rest of the world, despite a record harvest of 145 million
tonnes.
Comparing the two sets of estimates (Tables 2 and 4), it is
interesting to note that the decrease in the food use figure in
our estimate is offset by adding the changes of stocks, so that
the availability for feed and industrial usage are equivalent.
More to the point, in the two balance sheets for grain usage,
the feed available for animal husbandry is about the same,
in round figures 160 million tonnes of feed grain (including
soybean cakes), plus 40 million tonnes of milling sub-prod-
ucts. The total fine feed availability, 200 million tonnes, is
still 100 million short of the 300 million tonnes implicitly
required by the official data for meat (and other animal
products).((19)
Needless to say, our reasoning assumes that official grain
output data are accurate.((20) This assumption could be ques-
tioned in view of the huge uncertainties concerning cultivat-
ed land, and we have already analysed this issue in anoth-
er paper.((21) We compared the provincial data of land sur-
veys from the 1980s (published in Chinese in 1992) and of
the Census of 1997. Taking into account the inclusion of
non-agricultural lands (canals, dirt roads) and the fact that,
out of 127 million hectares cultivated in 2001, 21 million
corresponded to temporarily cultivated land,((22) we conclud-
ed that this issue did not significantly change crop outputs.
With respect to grain, it seems that if the sown surfaces are
indeed underestimated, observed yields are voluntarily
increased by the teams of the Statistical Bureau in order to
take measured underestimates into account and produce
reliable output figures.
In short, there is no “meat miracle” in China, but an overes-
timation in which actual output could be as low as 70 per-
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18. This is confirmed by the “Luo 2005” paper, which counts the “rural” population as that
presented in the “Agriculture” Chapter of the China Statistical Yearbook (935.5 million
rural inhabitants in 2003, etc.).
19. Long ago, J.R. Simpson (J.R. Simpson, Xu Cheng, and Akira Miyazaki, China’s Livestock
and Related Agriculture, Projections to 2025, Wallingford, CAB International, 1994, p. 474)
demonstrated that the “final result of demand and supply side projections of animal feed-
stuffs shows that 36 percent of the metabolisable energy requirements in 1989-91 […]
cannot be accounted for by using published statistics or derived through calculations”
(Ibid. p. 370). In their less technical, more economics-oriented study, Garnaut and Ma also
noticed differences between fine feed consumption figures depending on whether esti-
mates were derived through the demand or supply approach (Ross Garnaut and Guonan
Ma, Grain in China, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992, p. 151).
The authors did not elaborate beyond arguing that food and feed grain uses cannot be
easily distinguished in the small-scale framework of peasant farms. In 1997, Zhong
Funing already stressed the over-reporting of meat output statistics (“Exaggeration and
Causes of Meat Production Statistics Over-reporting in China,” in Zhongguo nongcun
jingji (Chinese Rural Economy), October 1997, pp. 63-66).
20. Detailed output data for each grain are available in “China’s Agriculture Yearbook”
(Ministry of Agriculture, Zhongguo nongye nianjian, Beijing, China Agriculture Press). 
21. Claude Aubert, “Of men, grain and pigs, puzzling out the statistical mysteries of China,”
Unpublished paper for the Inaugural Symposium of the White Rose East Asia Centre,
Sheffield, May 2007.
22. China Statistical Yearbook, 2006, p. 465.
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cent of the claimed figure. We will return to this issue in a
later section of this paper.Trends in  food grain uses
Before tackling the vexing issue of meat output estimates,
the preceding calculation has shown that it was possible to
assess food grain consumption for the year 2005. As the
data we used for that purpose are (for the most part) avail-
able in the rural and urban surveys carried out by the
Statistical Bureau for more than 20 years (the results for
2005 being published in the respective 2006 yearbooks
already quoted), it should be possible to trace back past
trends in food grain consumption. That’s exactly what we
have done, distinguishing between rural and urban consump-
tion for the main grains (paddy, wheat, corn, tubers, other
cereals, and pulses) in the years 1985 to 2005.
In the rural surveys, food grain consumption is expressed in
gross (un-milled) terms, and “grain” includes tubers, but not
pulses, which are counted separately. In the urban surveys
(at least for the most recent years), grain includes only cere-
als, with both tubers and pulses counted separately (data for
pulses are lacking since 2002). In these urban surveys, cere-
als are expressed in milled terms (rice instead of paddy, flour
and flour products instead of wheat). The rations presented
in Tables 5 and 6 are all expressed in un-milled terms (the
usual transformation ratios have been applied to paddy and
wheat), and include tubers and pulses. In years where data
are lacking (mainly for corn, other cereals, tubers, and puls-
es), estimates have been made by extrapolation from other
years. The resulting total rations are consistent with the offi-
cial totals (the urban figures being multiplied by a factor of
1.15 to 1.25 in order to take out-of-doors consumption into
account).((23)
For convenience, in the above tables we have only present-
ed the figures for 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. Both
rural and urban rations decreased during this 20-year peri-
od, but the urban ration decreased more rapidly than the
rural ration, by 25 percent as against 20 percent.((24)
In fact, the rural ration began its significant decrease only in
the last five years. During the first 15 years, while paddy
rations declined from 136 kg to 127 kg (113 kg in 2005),
wheat rations increased from 73 to 80 kg (but dropped to
69 kg in 2005). Throughout this time, secondary grain was
replaced by the more refined wheat in Northern areas. In
1985, secondary cereals and tubers totalled 18 percent of
the whole ration, but made up only 12 percent by 2005.
The decrease in the urban ration has been constant over
time, in line with grain consumption being replaced by meat
and animal products. While paddy consumption decreased
steadily and precipitously (115 kg in 1985 to 80 kg in 2005),
the wheat ration has been stable in recent years (at 50 kg,
against 65 kg in 1985). In the case of wheat, direct con-
sumption of flour for noodles or steamed bread has been
partly replaced by processed products (biscuits, etc.). As for
secondary cereals and tubers (Irish potatoes), contrary to
the situation in the countryside, urban consumption has
maintained a low but steady level of about 20 kg, with ration
share increasing from 10 percent in 1985 to 17 percent in
2005. Also of interest is the consistently high urban con-
sumption of pulses (mainly in the form of “tofu”) at 8 kg as
against only 3 kg in the countryside.
Applying the calculated rations to the rural and urban popu-
lations, it is now possible to reconstitute the grain consump-
tion trends of the last 20 years. We have retained for this cal-
culation the “rural” and “urban” population figures present-
ed in the “Population” chapter of the Statistical Yearbooks,
10 N o  2 0 0 8 / 2
23. The rations as calculated in the Tables 5 and 6 do not correspond with the totals quoted
in “Luo 2005.” According to that paper, the rural ration decreased from 237 kg in 1999 to
214 in 2003, and the urban ration remained basically unchanged at about 200 kg. As the
details of calculation are not explained, it is difficult to assess the reliability of these data.  
24. The rations quoted for the years 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2001 to 2003, by Tian Weiming
and Zhou Zhangyue (Chapter 5, p. 81 sq., in Zhang-Yue Zhou and Wei-Ming Tian, Grains
in China, foodgrain, feedgrain and world trade, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005, 255 pp., here-
after “Zhou and Tian 2005”) correspond exactly with our estimates for the rural ration,
decreasing from 258 kg in 1985 to 224 kg in 2003. However, the figures for urban
rations, expressed in milled terms, show a greater decline, from 135 kg to 80 kg, a
decrease of 40 percent against our estimated 25 percent. This difference is due to Tian
and Zhou not taking out-of-door consumption into account (80 kg is indeed the official
figure for purchases of grain by urban households), as a result of which their rural and
urban data are not comparable. 
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S p e c i a l  f e a t u r e
as these employ the demographical definitions of the
Census (the “rural” population given in the “Agriculture”
chapter corresponds with that included in the geographical
limits of the past People’s Communes, and includes urban
dwellers of townships and small towns (zhen)).
The choice of these figures is all the more important given
that urban rations are much lower than rural rations, with
the differential increasing over time (urban rations were 19
percent lower than rural rations in 1985, and 25 percent
lower in 2005). The urbanisation process is, therefore, the
main factor modelling the trends in food grain consump-
tion.((25) The urbanisation rate was 24 percent in 1985 (251
million urban against 808 million rural people), 26 percent
in 1990 (302 million against 841 million), 29 percent in
1995 (352 million against 859 million), 36 percent in
2000 (459 million against 808 million), and 43 percent in
2005 (562 million against 745 million). This increase in
urban residents, particularly rapid in the last five years,
coupled with the drop in rural and urban rations, explains
the trends in food grain consumption shown in the follow-
ing graphs.
The drop is particularly spectacular for total rural food
grain consumption (see Graph 1). After a peak of 228
million tonnes in 1993, the total was only 157 million in
2005. Paddy and wheat consumption shows a similar pat-
tern: 116 million tonnes of paddy in 1993, and 85 million
N o  2 0 0 8 / 2
25. Fred Gale estimates that migrants, the main driving factor in the urbanisation process,
have contributed to the decrease in food grain consumption by adjusting their grain con-
sumption to that of low-income urban dwellers. Fred Gale et al., “Analysis on the com-
mercialisation of rural residents’ food consumption in China,” in Zhongguo nongcun
jingji (Chinese Rural Economy), April 2006, p. 10.
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in 2005; 72 million tonnes of wheat in 1993, and 51 mil-
lion in 2005. Whereas total consumption exceeded 200
million tonnes during the first 15 years, it dropped by
more than 40 million tonnes in the last five years. This
corresponds closely with the recent decrease in rural
rations already noted, as well as with the rising wave of
migrant workers (nongmingong) leaving the countryside in
recent years.
Conversely, the urban total food grain consumption has con-
tinued to increase in spite of the drop in rations (see Graph
2). It grew from 52 million tonnes in 1985 to 89 million
tonnes in 2005. Paddy increased from 29 to 45 million
tonnes, and wheat from 16 million tonnes to 28 million.
The resulting trends in total food grain consumption are
therefore of primary interest in assessing the future (see
Graph 3). Beginning at 262 million tonnes in 1985, the total
reached its maximum level of 291 million tonnes in 1993,
then dropped to 246 million tonnes in 2005. Paddy con-
sumption, after a slow increase from 138 million tonnes in
1985 to 149 million tonnes in 1993, decreased to 130 mil-
lion tonnes in 2005. The initial increase in wheat consump-
tion was more marked than that of paddy, from 75 million
tonnes in 1985 to 93 million in 1993, before it decreased to
79 million tonnes in 2005. Whereas paddy consumption
was lower at the end of the period compared with the begin-
ning, wheat consumption remains slightly higher, but the
trend is clearly on the decrease, with consumption at 88 mil-
lion tonnes in 2000, compared with 79 million in 2005.((26)
Estimates  for  meat  and otheranimal products  
Given that the official figures on total meat output are prob-
ably wrong, one needs to turn to estimates in order to recon-
stitute past trends in meat output and corresponding feed
grain uses.
The official meat rations reported in the surveys of the
NBSC, multiplied by the corresponding numbers of rural
and urban residents, result in a total consumption much
lower than the officially stated outputs (see Table 7).
After converting the net meat total consumption derived
from the rations to gross consumption (carcass losses esti-
mated at 15 percent of the gross weight), consumption
appears to be only 55 percent of the official total meat out-
put (in carcass terms). More interestingly, consumption cor-
responded roughly to output in 1985, but the ratio declined
to 48 percent in 1995, before the rectification of meat out-
puts in 1996. Since then, consumption seems to have
remained at 55 percent of official output. If official rations
were to be believed, the overestimation of meat output
26. In “Luo 2005,” the unexplained data for urban and rural rations, plus the use of the
inflated “countryside” rural population figures, results in questionable total food grain
consumption figures. Although it decreases from 283 million tonnes in 1999 to 270 mil-
lion tonnes in 2003, this drop in consumption is less marked than in our estimates.
Moreover, no desegregated figures are available for paddy, wheat, corn, etc. As for Zhou
and Tian (2005), they do not calculate the resulting totals of food grain consumed by
rural and urban people.
S p e c i a l  f e a t u r e
should be much higher than that previously derived from
feed resource estimates (in which meat and other animal
products were considered only one third lower than official
figures). 
The problem is again that of out-of-doors meat consumption
by urban dwellers. This problem is further complicated as
processed meat (mainly pork) appears only after 1990, ren-
dering the whole ration series inconsistent. Estimates of out-
of-doors meat consumption is a matter of guess, so other ways
must be found to assess meat output and its past trends.((27) For
that purpose some arbitrary estimates will have to be made,
and the calculations we present below are open to debate.
First, we have tried to define production levels for animal
products relying on feed grain, consistent with the overall fig-
ure for availability of feed resources in 2005 (160 million
tonnes of feed grain, or 200 million tonnes of fine feed).
Using the same grain/meat ratios as in the Table 1, we get
total needs of about 195 million tonnes of fine feed with esti-
mated outputs of 35 million tonnes of pork (against the offi-
cial figure of 50 million), 14 million tonnes of eggs (against
29 million), 11 million tonnes of poultry meat (against 16
million), and the same figure as the official one for cow milk
(and estimates for draught animals). Our estimates are
therefore 30 percent less than the official figures for pork
and poultry meat, and our egg estimate is only 50 percent of
the official figure (see Table 8).
Reconstructing the past evolution of meat (and other relat-
ed animal husbandry products) is even more risky. We made
calculations for pork, poultry meat, and eggs (cow milk
being unchanged), but for the sake of convenience only the
case of pork will be detailed here. To make things simple,
we have retained the official rural pork rations on the
assumption that they are reliable. Urban ration estimates
ranged from 22 kg (17 kg official) in 1985 to 32 kg (20 kg
official) in 2005.((28) The net meat output was estimated at
85 percent of total gross output (carcass weight). In 1985,
the resulting total estimated output (carcass weight) was
16.30 million tonnes, similar to the official figure of 16.55
million tonnes. In 2005, the estimated output was 34.86 mil-
14 N o  2 0 0 8 / 2
27. In “Zhou and Tian 2005,” Wang Jimin and Zhou Zhangyue (Chapter 6, pp. 87-107, here-
after “Wang and Zhou 2005”) present very original and interesting estimates of meat
consumption. After making the same observation that we did regarding official con-
sumption being much lower than output, they try to reconcile the official meat output
with real data for consumption. To that end they use a sample survey of their own made
in 1998, in which they observed rural and urban consumption, including processed meat
and out-of-door consumption. On this basis, taking pork as an example, they arrive at a
ration of 24 kg per capita in 2000, against the official gross availability figure of 32 kg.
The difference is attributed to a high carcass loss rate of 24 percent.
28. For 2005, if we suppose that the processed red meat presented in the official urban meat
ration is mainly pork, then the total pork (and pork products) bought would be 24 kg. Our
estimated total urban ration of 32 kg would put out-of-door consumption at 8 kg, or 25
percent of the total ration (for 1998, the percentage of away-from-home urban consump-
tion of pork was estimated at 27 percent by Wang and Zhou; Cf. “Wang and Zhou 2005”).
The multiplying ratio required to take account of this out-of-door consumption would be
1.33, compared with the ratio of 1.25 used for the food grain urban ration.  
On. the other hand, Wang and Zhou’s observations for the pork rural ration in 1998 are
probably too high due to higher-than-average incomes, with 19 kg against the official
13 kg (retained in our calculations). This results in a total net consumption of pork of 31
million tonnes for the year 2000, against our estimated 25 million tonnes (or 29 million
tonnes carcass weight, with a carcass weight loss rate of 15 percent). The official fig-
ure for that year was 40 million tonnes.
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lion tonnes against the official figure of 50.11 million tonnes.
Ration estimates for the intermediate years have been some-
what arbitrary, following an S curve, with an increased rate
of growth for the years 1990-2000.
A similar calculation was made for poultry meat, and offi-
cial figures were retained for beef and mutton productions
(as these products were not assumed to be mainly fed on
grain). The resulting meat output trends are presented in
Graph 4.
If our assumptions are correct, pork would have increased
by 3.9 percent yearly from 1985 to 2005 (with a doubling
of output, 16 to 35 million tonnes) instead of the 5.7 per-
cent (17 to 50 million) recorded in official data. For the last
five years, both rates of growth were comparable, around 4
percent (3.6 percent for our estimates, 4.4 percent for the
official data). The yearly rates of growth for poultry meat
were more than the double those for pork, at an estimated
8.6 percent (resulting in a quintupling of the output, from 2
million tonnes in 1985 to 11 million in 2005). The growth
in output of beef and mutton was the fastest, at 12.6 per-
cent annually (from 1 million to 11 million tonnes).
The total estimated output of meat, 57 million tonnes (or 44
kg per capita), would be about 25 percent lower than the offi-
cial 77 million tonnes (see Graph 5). For the year 2005, pork
would represent only 61 percent of the total output (down
from 84 percent in 1985), and the per capita gross availabili-
ty would be 27 kg (compared with the official 38 kg).
Although lower than the official data for pork and poultry,
our estimated figures still indicate impressive performance in
meat production over the last 20 years.
Food Security and Consumption Patterns in China
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S p e c i a l  f e a t u r e
Feed grain est imates
Having made estimates for meat and other animal products,
it is possible to calculate the feed grain (and fine feed)
needed for each year from 1985 to 2005. We have applied
grain conversion rations to the corresponding output figures
of pork, eggs, poultry meat, and cow milk, based on histor-
ical data from “Agricultural Products Costs and Benefits.”
Calculations for the benchmark years of 1985 to 2005 are
presented in Table 9, using our estimated outputs for pork,
eggs, and poultry meat. For poultry meat we have deduct-
ed from the total output the meat corresponding to slaugh-
tered egg-laying hens, hens’ feed being counted as feed for
egg production. The outputs for cow milk use the official
figures. Beef and mutton are not counted, as meat cattle
and sheep are not supposed to be primarily fed with grain.
Draught animals include only oxen (not water buffaloes),
horses, mules, and donkeys.
Changes in animal husbandry techniques have resulted in
marked changes in the grain (fine feed)/meat (or eggs or
milk) conversion ratios. For pork, the fine feed figures pre-
sented in the “Cost and Benefits” surveys are relative to
16 N o  2 0 0 8 / 2
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live weights, so the computed ratios are based on carcass
weights estimated at 75 percent of the live weights. These
ratios decreased from 4.5 kg of fine feed per kg of pork
carcass in 1985 to 3.3 in 2005, reflecting the transition
from traditional backyard pig raising to large-scale pig
farms. The same trends are observed in the feed ratios for
eggs, decreasing from 4.1 to 2.4, and poultry meat, from
4 to 2.5. Ratios for cow milk have been assumed to
remain unchanged.
From the total required fine feed we have deducted
milling sub-products (as calculated from the milling of
paddy and wheat used for food) to arrive at the food grain
uses (including pulses in the form of soybean cakes). The
resulting feed grain estimates show a doubling of the grain
used for feed, from 70 million tonnes in 1985 to 160 mil-
lion tonnes in 2005.  
For each year, we have distributed the feed grain used
among the different categories of grain (see Graph 6).
Fixed quantities have been estimated for paddy and
wheat, and all tubers left after food have been counted as
feed. For pulses, feed corresponds with soybean cakes,
other beans being counted as food (as well as soybean
transformed into tofu). For secondary cereals, feed is the
total left after food and industrial uses (alcohol (baijiu)
from sorghum or millet). For maize, the amount used for
feed is the amount left after we have deducted all other
feed grain from the total feed grain needed. As this
amount does not correspond exactly with the estimated
amount of corn left after food and industrial uses, the dif-
ferences are attributed to changes of stocks.
Given the number of assumption made, our results are
open to question. In particular, the use of paddy earlier in
the period could have been higher than estimated.
Nevertheless, Graphs 6 and 7 give some indication of
trends in feed composition over the past 20 years. 
Traditional grain feeds such as corn and tubers (sweet
potatoes) have maintained their importance in the total
feed grain (56-60 percent for corn, 11-12 percent for
tubers). Both have more than doubled in amount, from 39
million tonnes in 1985 to 95 million in 2005 for corn,
which remains the main component of feed, and from 8
million tonnes to 18 for tubers. At the same time, the
share of fine grains such as paddy and wheat has shrunk
from 18 percent of the total to 10 percent (16 million
tonnes altogether in 2005). Other grains have simply dis-
appeared, having been replaced by pulses (soybean
cakes), which at 31 million tonnes constituted 19 percent
of the total feed in 2005 (compared with 3 million tonnes
and only 5 percent in 1985). Clearly, at least in the most
developed parts of the countryside (sweet potatoes are
more common in poor soils or on slopes), feed composi-
tion has followed the trend of large-scale farms toward
corn-soybean cakes.((29)
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29. In 2004, 38 percent of the pigs slaughtered in China came from farms having more than
50 hogs’ heads (deduced from the 2005 Zhongguo xumuye nianjian (Animal Husbandry
Yearbook 2005), Ministry of Agriculture, Beijing, China Agriculture Press).
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S p e c i a l  f e a t u r e
Grain use  and food secur ity
After establishing our estimates for food, feed and industry,
it is now possible to see the trends in grain uses (including
seeds and waste) from 1985 to 2005 (see Graph 8).
Food and feed are the two main components of grain use.
They present opposite trends, as food use has slowly but
steadily decreased since the mid 1990s, while feed use has
grown rapidly (see above). Any discussion of food security
must therefore take account of this fundamental distinction
and the different prospects for the types of grain involved.
Food security can be conveniently measured by the degree
18
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of self-sufficiency in the main grains (calculated as the ratio
of output to uses, before trade).((30) From this point of view,
it would be of interest to assess the situation of the past 20
years, given that we have already estimated the total uses for
this period (see Graph 9).
For the whole of the 1990s, grain output seems to be in excess,
with a huge surplus beginning in 1994. This period contrasts
with large deficits in the early 2000s, with balance being
restored only for the last two years of 2004 and 2005. This sit-
uation is all the more astonishing in that the imbalances were
not corrected by exports or imports, as shown in Graph 10,
where the total availability of grain after trade is compared with
the uses. It is only massive imports of soybean in the last two
years that have resulted in a surplus in total availability.
The particular circumstances of these two distinct periods
deserve a few words of explanation.
First, it should be noted that, with the exception of 2003,
the deficit years were limited to deficits of less than 5 per-
cent of the total utilisation. The deficit reached 8 percent in
2003 (40 million tonnes, with 430 million tonnes of output
against 470 million tonnes in uses). Therefore the official
goal of a self-sufficiency ratio in grain of over 95 percent was
achieved in all years but 2003. However, if only cereals, and
not all grains (including tubers and pulses) are counted in
the calculation of the self-sufficiency ratio, the results would
be somewhat different for 2003, with a deficit of 20 million
tonnes, or 5 percent of uses (394 million tonnes uses against
374 million tonnes output).  
Over the past 20 years, therefore, the official goal can be
considered to have been basically achieved, depending on
the definition of grain.((31)
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30. In fact, food security was defined by the FAO in 1974 as the availability for everyone, every-
where, of enough food for sustaining a healthy life. This definition was amended in 1983 by
incorporating the capacity to buy adequate food for this purpose. This concept differs from
“food safety” (shipin anquan or shipin weisheng) as described by Liu Weijun et al.
(“Summary research on food security understandings, problems of their origins and relat-
ed policies,” in Zhongguo nongcun guancha (China Rural Survey), N°4, 2007, p. 67 sq.).
Within the limited scope of this paper we cannot develop the problem of disparities in food
grain availabilities among poor and rich areas, or among deficit and surplus regions. As con-
cerns poverty, mainly in Western China, the official number of 23 million people living under
the poverty line (683 RMB annual income per capita) is underestimated; with a poverty line
fixed at 1,100 RMB, there would be 80 million poor, or over 10 percent of the rural popula-
tion (Cf. Xiaolu Wang, in China Daily, 26 September 2007). According to a survey conduct-
ed in poor villages in 2005, 58 percent of the peasants could not feed themselves with their
own production (Chen Qianheng and Li Junpei, “The situation of food security of farmers in
impoverished regions with implications for policy,” in Zhongguo nongcun jingji (Chinese
Rural Economy), December 2006, pp. 20-24.). The problem is different for the grain deficit
(but high income) provinces of the Eastern coast of China, which can rely on imports from
the surplus areas of Central and Northern China (Cf. suggestive maps in Wei-Ming Tian et
al., Chapter 9,  “Zhou and Tian 2005,” pp.151-152). 
Another distinction has been proposed by Li Peng et al. (“China’s current grain security
in context of food security,” in Zhongguo nongcun jingji (Chinese Rural Economy), June
2005, pp. 4-10) between the common Chinese approach of “food security” (liangshi
anquan, literally “grain security”) concerning only grain, and the “food guarantee”
(shiwu baozhang) covering other foods as well as grain. On this basis they calculate an
“ability of surplus supply.” However, as grain is still the basis for a number of other foods
(notably animal products), the term liangshi anquan remains significant. The authors
rightly point to the decrease in direct grain consumption and the increasing feed uses
(but the levels indicated in their Table 1, p. 8, are somewhat incongruous).
31. From our independent estimates incorporated into Graph 10, we can calculate that the
cumulative grain balances (counted after trade) from 1985 reached 230 million tonnes
at the end of the year 2005. This figure, corresponding to State and on-farm stocks, is
consistent with officially published current grain inventories: “around 250 million
tonnes, including the government, enterprises, and farmers” (Cf. Zeng Liying, deputy
director of the State Administration of Grain, in China Daily, 5 May 2008).   
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S p e c i a l  f e a t u r e
The big problem of the recent past is actually the gross
imbalances that appeared in the surplus years of the 1990s
contrasting with the deficit years that followed. In our opin-
ion, these imbalances were not the result of climate or pro-
duction hazards, but of the mismanagement of grain com-
mercialisation by the state grain administration. After the
failure of total liberalisation of the domestic grain trade in
1993,((32) procurement quotas were reinstated in 1994, but at
a very high level in the context of inflation at that time. Even
so, the price was not high enough, as market prices were
increasing even more rapidly. A kind of speculative bubble
appeared in 1994-1996, with prices continuing to climb
20 N o  2 0 0 8 / 2
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32. We have analysed the failed reform of 1993 in a previous paper (Claude Aubert, “The
grain trade reforms in China: An unfinished story of State vs. peasant interest,” in China
Information, vol. 12, n° 3, 1998, pp. 72-86). Jiang Changyun (“A review and its inspira-
tion from several occurrence of imbalances in grain supply and demand since the begin-
ning of reform and opening,” in Zhongguo Nongcun Guancha (China Rural Survey), N°2,
2006, pp. 8-15) describes this early crisis only in terms of decreased paddy output,
without reference to the aborted commercialisation reform of 1993.
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while huge surpluses were stocked by farmers or the state.((33)
The bubbled burst in 1997, with market prices dropping
below procurement prices (see the example of wheat prices
in Graph 11). Despite state measures to establish support
prices (at an intermediary level between the high but unsus-
tainable procurement prices and the low market prices) and
forbid farmers from selling grain directly to private traders,
the situation spiralled out of control. Eventually the procure-
ment prices were progressively phased out, while market
prices hit bottom in 2000-2002. The whole procurement
system was finally abolished in 2004. In 2003, the selling of
stock pushed prices to their lowest level, and output was
down by a big margin. The following year, market forces
finally pushed up the prices, and the crisis was soon over. 
The result of the price drop was diminishing profits from the
main grain cultivation (see the examples of net incomes from
wheat and paddy in Graph 12). The peasants reacted to this
situation, first by selling their stocks, then by decreasing
their sown surfaces (see example of wheat and paddy,
Graph 13). The result, with unchanged yields, was a drop
in output (Graph 14). Wheat dropped from 123 million
tonnes to 86 million, and paddy from 201 to 161. The total
grain harvest then fell from 512 million tonnes in 1998 to
431 million tonnes in 2003. With the rebound in prices and
benefits in 2004, grain output recovered to 484 million
tonnes in 2005 (and 497 million tonnes in 2006).
Throughout the crisis, grain deficits were offset by putting
huge farm and state stocks on the market so that no imports
were needed (see cereal net trade, Graph 15). Corn even
achieved net exports of 16 million tonnes by 2003. Wheat
imports remained negligible until 2003 (followed by 5 mil-
lion tonnes imported in 2004, for tackling the previous year’s
wheat deficit and depleted stocks), and rice exports
remained stable.
What could have been a serious grain security crisis was
only a rectification of the grain market after the bubble of
the mid-90s. This applies, however, only to cereals, as soy-
bean imports have exploded in recent years (up to 28 mil-
lion tonnes in 2006, see Graph 16). This should remind us
that at present and for the foreseeable future, prices are like-
ly to remain the main determinant for output levels and
therefore for grain security among the main food cereals.  
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33. The problem of stocks was first analysed by Frederick Crook (Frederick W Crook,
“China’s Grain Stocks: Background and Analytical Issue,” in International Agriculture and
Trade Report: China, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, WRS-
96-2, June 1996, pp. 35-39). In our previous paper in Déméter 2005, we made esti-
mates of on-farm carry-over stocks based on the year-end stocks reported in the NCBS
rural surveys, and deducting the provisions for food, feed, and seeds of the following
year. Ke Binsheng (in Chapter 8 of Yongzheng Yang and Weiming Tian, (ed.), China’s
Agriculture at the Crossroads, London, MacMillan, 2000, pp. 118-128) made the same
calculations, but applied a uniform rate of 25 percent of year-end stocks to estimate
carry-over stocks, whatever the level of stocks each year. According to our estimates,
these stocks increased from about 110 million tonnes in 1991 to 285 million in 1998.
At that time, the state stocks were estimated at 235 million tonnes, which combined
with on-farm stocks totalling an astonishing 520 million tonnes, equivalent to one year’s
output. Wan Guanghua and Zhang Ouxiang have made an interesting analysis of how
peasant behaviour affected the stocks, concluding that the effect of prices was exacer-
bated by irrational assessments of the situation (“Determinants for farmers’ households
grain storage in China: Does price matter?” in Zhongguo nongcun jingji (Chinese Rural
Economy), May 2007, pp. 13-23).
S p e c i a l  f e a t u r e
Conclusion
In short, our analysis of consumption patterns during the last
20 years in China concludes that the so-called “grain prob-
lem” is a purely statistical artefact. While it is true that
Chinese data are misleading and official figures for meat out-
put are greatly over-estimated,((34) once the necessary correc-
tions are made, the resulting estimates indicate that food secu-
rity was achieved despite an unprecedented change in con-
sumption patterns with the transition from grain to meat.
According to our very conservative estimates, meat output
would have grown from 20 million tonnes in 1985 to 57 mil-
lion in 2005, with gross availability per capita more than dou-
bling from 18 kg to 43 kg. This is indeed a great achievement,
considering that it was reached while securing a grain self-suf-
ficiency ratio (as defined by the ratio of domestic output to all
uses before trade) of 95 percent or greater, the only exception
being the year 2003, when this ratio dropped to 92 percent.
The big challenge for Chinese agriculture in the past two
decades was not only to provide enough food for a growing
population, but also to allow transition to a meat-oriented
diet. This challenge has been met with success while food
security was preserved.
This rosy conclusion might appear at odds with the present
situation of worldwide food price inflation. Some media even
put blame on China, alleging that increased meat consump-
tion there is behind the rising price of foodstuffs, particularly
cereals, worldwide. This could not be more wrong. While
China is a major importer of soybean (counted as “grain”) at
30 million tonnes in 2007, this situation is not new, and the
very high import levels in previous years (28 million tonnes
in 2006, 26 million in 2005) did not result in a worldwide
inflation of cereal prices such as that observed since 2007.
On the contrary, China was a net exporter of cereals in 2007:
five million tonnes of corn, three million tonnes of wheat, and
one million tonnes of rice.((35) Indeed, the increase in rice and
wheat retail prices in China in 2007 actually resulted from
inflation in these prices in the world market.((36)
Having said that, the present situation may not last forever,
and the “grain problem” could actually arise in the near
future. In this regard, we recommend considering two main
aspects: first, short-term (the next few years) versus longer-
term prospects; and secondly, prospects for food grain (main-
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34. The NBSC official “Statistical Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China on the 2007,”
28 February 2008 (Cf. http://www.stats.gov.cn/), indicates that the total output of meat for
2007 was 68 million tonnes, 3.5 percent lower than the previous year. If this figure is con-
firmed by later publications, it would mean that the meat output for 1996 was 70.4 million
tonnes, compared with the 80.5 million tonnes quoted for that year in the Statistical
Yearbook 2007 (p. 485). In other words, following the Agricultural Census of 2007 (figures
for the end of 2006), the meat output would have been revised downward by 12.5 percent.
35. Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, 4 February 2008. These exports are in line with the high
level of state stocks, which the USDA estimated at 115 million tonnes for the end of the
agricultural year 2007-2008 (Cf. USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, People’s Republic
of China, Grain and Feed, Annual 2008, 1 March 2008).
36. Cf. Jikun Huang in People’s Daily, 24 March 2008. In order to limit food prices inflation,
China has tried to stop exports of cereals for the year 2008 by scraping former export
VAT rebates and installing instead export tariffs (Cf. China Daily, 30 December 2007).
The result has been a slowing of the cereals domestic prices’ growth, contrasting with
the surge of world market prices (Cf. Jikun Huang, Scott Rozelle and Hanguang Qiu,
“Food prices and inflation in China”, in CLSA U, May 2008).
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ly paddy and wheat) versus feed grain (corn and soybean).
For the short term, prices of wheat and paddy will remain
the main factors in output levels and therefore in the degree
of self-sufficiency for China. The declining trend in total rice
and wheat food consumption should facilitate this objective
of self-sufficiency, and the current high prices should provide
Chinese farmers with incentive to produce and sell enough
staple food grains. However, rising material costs (fuel oil,
seeds, and fertilizers) may offset the benefits of higher pro-
ducer prices. In order to tackle this problem, the Chinese
government has already raised the minimum purchase prices
for rice and wheat while substantially increasing direct sub-
sidies to farmers.((37) More generally, the present context of
volatile international prices may put into question the very
concept of food grain security.((38)
The situation differs for feed grain. China is already short
on corn (the present exports, 5 million tonnes for 2007, are
probably speculative sales of stock due to the high world
trade market prices), and presents a high deficit for soybean.
Larger imports of soybeans, and imports of corn at some
point, can therefore be expected. The very high price of
feed is already affecting pig farms (still recovering from the
“blue ear” epidemic) as well as the dairy industry, translat-
ing into high prices for meat. The resulting inflation penalis-
es low-income urban dwellers, but does not imperil global
food security based on staple food grain.
For the middle and long term, prospects are much more difficult
to assess, with uncertainties quite high for future harvests. The
lack of water resources in northern China will be exacerbated by
pollution and competition from urban and industrial uses.
Climate vagaries have already appeared, with unusual droughts
in southwest China, and cold winter and snow in south and cen-
tral China. In the long term, climate change will affect the whole
cropping system of China, rending projections inoperable.((39)
If the “grain problem” is purely statistical at present, there is
a real danger that it will someday become an intractable and
frightening reality in China, as well as in the rest of the
world. •
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37. People’s Daily, 28 March 2008.
38. Wang Yapeng (“Reflections on optional paths for China’s food security,” in Zhongguo
nongcun jingji (Chinese Rural Economy), March 2005, pp. 4-11), with reference to the
2001-2003 grain crisis, reminds us of the strategic character of food grain, and under-
lines the necessity of a minimum self-sufficiency that takes account of the uncertain-
ties of the WTO and the difficulty of replacing grain farming with high-value agricultur-
al products that face quality and standardisation obstacles as exports.
On the other hand, Jiang Changyun (“To coordinate the relations between food security
and income growth of the farmers,” in Nongye jingji wenti (Issues in Agricultural
Economy), February 2005, pp. 44-48) argues that a 10 percent deficit in grain (on the
basis of 490 million tonnes of consumption and 20 million tonnes of imports for soy-
bean) would result in only 29 million tonnes of cereal deficit, comparable to the imports
of Japan, and would be unable to trigger a significant rise in worldwide prices as long
as the progression of imports is smooth and spread over a number of years.
39. Chen Yongfu (“Supply and demand of grain in China: A projection,” in Nongye jingji wenti
(Issues in Agricultural Economy), April 2005, pp. 8-13) nonetheless uses his own model
to make projections for the year 2020: 3.3 million tonnes net exports for paddy, 8.3 mil-
lion tonnes net imports for wheat, 24.7 million tonnes net imports for corn, and 36.3 mil-
lion tonnes net imports for soybean.
Wen James Guanzhong (Chapter 12, in Xiaoyuan Dong, Shunfeng Song, and Xiaobo
Zhang (ed.), China’s Agricultural Development, challenges and prospects, Aldershot,
Ashgate, 2006, pp. 207-239), presents different scenarios, depending on population
growth, grain/meat (and other animal products) ratios, and production growth, which
result in divergent figures according to the specified scenarios: from 90 million tonnes
deficit for the year 2020, in the case of high population, and low supply (Cf. Ibid. p. 232).
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